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I. A Pox on Reversals! 
All hail great Judge! 
To your bright rays, 
We never grudge 
Ecstatic praise. 
All hail! all hail! 
All hail! all hail! all hail! 
May each decree 
As statute rank, 
And never be 
Reversed in Bane. 
All hail! all hail! 
All hail! all hail! all hail! 
http://math.boisestate.edu/gas/trial!weboperaltbj03 .htm I, visited 
[Or, perhaps more realistically, to quote the Captain in Gilbert and Sullivan' s HM S. Pinafore: 
"Never? Well , hardly ever! "] 
Administrative law judges (AU 's), like trial judges, minimize their chances of reversal 
by writing their opinions so as to persuade the reviewing agency or court that they reached the 
right decision in the first instance - or that even if the reviewing body would be inclined to rule 
differently, it should defer to the ALl. The ALJ's task is to "make the record sing" so well 
that the reviewing body finds itself humming along. 
II. Fact-Finding When Credibility Must Be Evaluated 
Credibility must often be evaluated, though not always. Sometimes, of course, even 
assuming all the evidence otfered on behalf of a patty to be true, that party must lose as a matter 
oflaw. 
A. What Is "Credibility"? 
Most hearings raise issues of credibility: to which of the evidence, if any, to give credit. 
Credibility may be defined as "'the quality or power of inspiring belief. '" Indiana Metal Prods. 
v. NLRB, 442 F.2d 46,51 (7th Cir. 1971) (quoting Webster's Third New International Dictionary 
(1966)). 
Credibility "involves more than demeanor. It apprehends the over-all evaluation of 
testimony in the light of its rationality or internal consistency and the manner in which it 
hangs together with other evidence." Carbo v. United States, 314 F .2d 718, 749 (9th Cir. 
1963). When there is conflicting evidence, ALl's may croon: 
A nice dilemma we have here, 
That calls for all our wit, for all our wit, 
That calls for all, 
That calls for all our wit. 
Gilbert & Sullivan Archive, Trial by Jury, 
http://math.boisestate.eduJgas/trialiwebopera/tbj 12.html, last visited June 28, 2007. 
1. "Demeanor" Evidence 
"Demeanor evidence refers to the non-verbal cues given by a witness while testifying, 
including voice tone, facial expressions, body language, and other cues such as the manner 
of testifying, and the witnesses's attitude while testifying." Gregory L. Ogden, The Role of 
Demeanor Evidence in Determining Credibility of Witnesses in Fact-Finding: The View of 
AU's, 20 J. NAALJ 1,2 (2000) (survey results). 
2. Non-Demeanor Factors Relevant to Credibility 
Non-demeanor factors relevant to a witness's credibility fall into three categories: 
(a) The witness's bad character for truthfulness: 
1. The witness's prior convictions; 
2. The witness's pertinent prior bad acts, which have not resulted in his or 
her criminal conviction, but the hearing judge finds relevant to character 
for truthfulness; 
3. The witness's bad reputation for truthfulness, or another witness's 
bad opinion of the witness's truthfulness; 
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(b) The witness, even though well-meaning, is mistaken: 
4. Bad eyesight, hearing, etc.; 
5. Use of drugs or alcohol at pertinent time (either time of event or when 
testifying); 
6. Conditions under which witness's observation were made, e.g., poor 
lighting, witness upset, fearful; 
7. Suggestiveness of, e. g., identification procedure; or 
(c) Either the witness is lying or is mistaken: 
8. Bias that may have affected perception and memory; or bias, interest, 
prejudice, or improper motive, giving the witness a reason to lie; 
9. The witness's prior inconsistent statements, closer to the time of the 
event, when memory was fresher; or the witness's prior inconsistent 
statements (showing an inability to "keep his or her story straight"); 
10. Contradictory substantive evidence (real or from other witnesses who 
observed the same event) (this has the secondary effect of also impeaching 
this witness's testimony) (corroborating evidence would enhance 
credibility); 
11. The plausibility of the facts being as the witness testifies. 
See, e.g., Haebe v. Department of Justice, 288 F.3d 1288, 1302 n. 30 (Fed. Cir. 2002); John L. 
Kane, Judging Credibility, 33 LITIGATION No.3, 31 (Spring 2007); Christopher W. Sanchirico, 
Evidence, Procedure, and the Upside of Cognitive Error, 57 STAN. L. REV. 291, 358-59 (2004) 
(for example, in the prosecution of Martha Stewart, evidence that contradicted her defense 
included both an entry by her assistant in a computer phone log, that "Peter Bacanovic thinks 
ImClone is going to start trading downward." and the fact that Bacanovic's worksheet with 
regard to Stewart's holdings contained no notation of an instruction to sell TmClone if it went 
below $60/share); James P. Timony, Demeanor Credibility (Witness Truth-Telling), 49 CATH. U. 
L. REv. 903 (2000). 
Tn a survey of 56 federal judges regarding standards for evaluating credibility, "Clear 
winners were internal inconsistency and external contradiction. Demeanor fared somewhat less 
well, with ... most judges rating it somewhat better than middling, tending toward 'one of the 
better indices' which deserved at least the importance that jurors usually ascribe to it. Character 
... was [for most judges] simply 'one of several factors that should be taken into account."'). 
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H. Richard Uviller, Credence, Character, and the Rules of Evidence: Seeing Through the Liar's 
Tale, 42 DUKE L.J. 776, 825 (1993). 
B. More Choices than Either "All or Nothing" 
Although the maxim "falsus in unius, falsus in omnibus" suggests that one lie or mistaken 
statement supports rejecting all of that witness's testimony, that is neither required nor does it 
comport with experience. See, e.g., NLRB v. Regal Knitwear Co., 140 F.2d 746 (2d Cir. 1944) 
(per curiam) ["[C]onfusion as to details is not uncommon in the stories of entirely honest and 
reliable witnesses. "). 
As Md. Pattern Jury Instruction [Civil] I :3, for example, instructs: "You need not 
believe any witness even though the testimony is uncontradicted. You may believe all, part, or 
none of the testimony of any witness." 
III. Greater Deference Given to ALJ's Demeanor-Based ("Testimonial Inferences") 
rather than Other ("Derivative Inferences") Assessments of Credibility 
Both administrative agencies receiving "proposed" decisions by ALJ's and courts 
performing judicial review of agency decisions distinguish between ALl's credibility 
assessments based on demeanor and those based on non-demeanor factors. Only the ALJ's 
demeanor-based evaluations (referred to in the literature as "testimonial inferences") are 
given special deference. The agency need not defer to an ALl's credibility determinations 
(referred to as "derivative inferences") based on non-demeanor factors. 
A. The Importance Historically Accorded to Demeanor Evidence 
We have long held fast to the notion that seeing a witness while the witness testifies is of 
great import in evaluating the witness's credibility. See, e.g., Pharaon v. Board ~fGovernors ~f 
Fed Reserve Sys., 135 F.3d 148,154 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (citing "the significance of personal 
observation to credibility determinations"); Md. Pattern Jury Instruction [Civil] 1:3 (providing 
in part: "In determining whether a witness should be believed, you should carefully judge all the 
testimony and evidence and the circumstances under which each witness has testified. Among 
the factors that you should consider are the following: (1) the witness' behavior on the stand 
and way of testifying . ... "). 
Demeanor evidence has been accorded crucial importance since early Roman times. 
E.g., NLRB v. Dinion Coil Co., 201 F.2d 484, 487-88 (2d Cir. 1952). See, e.g., Jeremy A 
Blumenthal, A Wipe of the Hands, a Lick of the Lips: The Validity of Demeanor Evidence in 
Assessing Witness Credibility, 72 NEB. L. REV. 1157 (1993); David S. Buckel, Penalizing the 
Failure to Make Proper Credibility Findings in Disability Cases, 23 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 945 
(1989). 
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Indeed, this value underlies the hearsay rule, a criminal accused's sixth amendment 
confrontation right, and the element of an opportunity to cross-examine that is generally found 
to be ensconced in the due process clause. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 43(a) (testimony of 
witnesses shall be given "in open court") & 52 ("due regard shall be given to the opportunity of 
the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses"). See generally James P. Timony, 
Demeanor Credibility (Witness Truth-Telling), 49 CATH. U. L. REV. 903 (2000); Olin G. 
Wellborn, Demeanor, 76 CORNELL L. REV. at 1075, 1076-77 (1991). 
B. The Inadequacy of a Cold Transcript 
Seeing and hearing a witness testify provides "demeanor evidence" which is 
unfathomable from a stark transcript of the testimony. Consider this example, plucked by Chief 
ALJ Timony of the FTC from the movie, "My Cousin Vinnie": 
Tony: Why are you arresting me? 
Sheriff: Because we think you shot the store clerk. 
Tony: I shot the store clerk!! 
Sheriff: You shot the store clerk? 
Tony: I shot the store clerk!!! 
Sheriff: I knew you'd confess. 
James P. Timony, Demeanor Credibility (Witness Truth-Telling), 49 CATH. U. L. REv. 903 
(2000). The reader cannot tell: Was Tony confessing or was he instead shocked that he was 
being accused? 
As Judge Jerome Frank explained: 
[T]he demeanor of an orally-testifying witness is "always assumed to be in 
evidence." It is "wordless language." The liar's story may seem 
uncontradicted to one who merely reads it, yet it may be "contradicted" in 
the trial court by his manner, his intonations, his grimaces, his gestures, and 
the like-all matters which "cold print does not preserve" and which 
constitute "lost evidence" so far as an upper court is concerned. For such a court, 
it has been said, even if it were called a "rehearing court," is not a "reseeing 
court." Only were we to have "talking movies" of trials could it be otherwise. A 
"stenographic transcript correct in every detail fails to reproduce tones of voice 
and hesitations of speech that often make a sentence mean the reverse of what the 
words signify. The best and most accurate record is like a dehydrated peach; it 
has neither the substance nor the flavor of the fruit before it was dried." It 
resembles a pressed flower. The witness' demeanor, not apparent in the record, 
may alone have "impeached" him .... 
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Broadcast Music v. Havana Madrid Restaurant Corp., 175 F.2d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 1949). Accord, 
e.g., NLRB v. Universal Camera Corp., 190 F.2d 429, 431 (2d Cir. 1951) (Learned Hand, J.) (on 
remand). But see Olin G. Wellborn, Demeanor, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1075 (1991) (urging civil 
trials by deposition transcript). 
C. Demeanor Evaluations Are Imperfect at Best 
There is no "science" to demeanor evaluations. Like Othello, we may misjudge our 
fellows' veracity: 
The Moor is of a free and open nature, 
That thinks men honest that but seem to be so; 
And will as tenderly be led by the nose as asses are. 
(Othello, Act 1, Sc. 3, 1. 405-8). 
1. Empirical Evidence Suggests Visual Cues Are Misleading 
Empirical research concludes that demeanor cues - such as fidgeting, blinking, 
pressing one's lips, or touching one's face, and particularly, avoiding eye contact - are 
unhelpful in detecting whether a person is lying. Jeremy A. Blumenthal, A Wipe of the Hands, 
a Lick of the Lips: The Validity of Demeanor Evidence in Assessing Witness Credibility, 72 NEB. 
L. REv. 1157 (1993); Christopher W. Sanchirico, Evidence, Procedure, and the Upside of 
Cognitive Error, 57 STAN. L. REv. 291 (2004); Siegfried L. Sporer & Barbara Schwandt, 
Moderators of Nonverbal Indicators of Deception: A Meta-Analytic Synthesis, 13 PSYCHOL. PUB. 
POL'y & L. (2007); Olin G. Wellborn, Demeanor, 76 CORNELL L. REv. 1075 (1991) 
("Observers commonly assume that people who are being deceptive are uncomfortable, 
shifty, restless in their seats, and move their heads in all directions so as to avoid an 
observer's scrutiny. During actual deception, however, there is in fact a decrease in each of 
these behaviors."). Contra PAUL EKMAN, TELLING LIES: CLUES TO DECEIT IN THE 
MARKETPLACE, POLITICS, AND MARRIAGE (2d ed. 1992). 
Indeed, a 1999 survey of 100 ALJ's shows that they rate the importance of demeanor 
evidence as merely one of many factors in evaluating credibility. Gregory L. Ogden, The 
Role of Demeanor Evidence in Determining Credibility of Witnesses in Fact-Finding: The View 
of AU's, 20 J. NAALJ at 1,8, 11 (2000). Its importance increased when coupled with other 
non-demeanor credibility factors. Id. at 14. The ALl's also report that, more frequently than 
they encounter "liars," they see witnesses whose memories are frail. See, e.g., Anderson v. 
Department of Public Safety & Correctional Servs., 330 Md. 187,201,623 A.2d 198,205 (1993) 
(AU there found that "The variations in [the] reports resulted from the difference in recollections 
of the writers rather than any intent to falsify an official report."). 
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2. Auditory Cues May be More Valuable 
In addition to visual "tells," there are auditory ones: manner of speech, tone of voice, 
hesitancy. Controlled experiments provide support for the proposition that evaluation by the 
fact-finder of auditory aspects ofa witness's demeanor is more reliable than that of visual 
aspects. Jeremy A. Blumenthal, A Wipe of the Hands, a Lick of the Lips: The Validity of 
Demeanor Evidence in Assessing Witness Credibility, 72 NEB. L. REV. 1157, 1195 (1993) ("Most 
of the behaviors received through the auditory channel that were associated with perceptions of 
deception were also observed during actual deception: increases in speech hesitations, speech 
errors, and in the pitch ofa speaker's voice.") (footnote omitted). This "manner oftestifying 
(e.g., evasive or direct)" was also rated the most important by the ALJ's in the survey 
(others, ranked in descending importance, were "witness's attitude" (positive or negative), "body 
language," "facial expressions," and "voice tone."). Gregory L. Ogden, The Role of Demeanor 
Evidence in Determining Credibility of Witnesses in Fact-Finding: The View ofALJ's, 20 1. 
NAALJ 1, 13 (2000). 
Of course, the empirical evidence is from controlled experiments, not actual hearings. 
Many, ifnot all of these auditory behaviors are also correlated with stress. Stress likely 
correlates with testifying, but is it clear that it necessarily correlates more closely with 
testifyingjaiseiy? See John L. Kane, Judging Credibility, 33 LiTIGATION NO.3, 31 (Spring 
2007); Christopher W. Sanchirico, Evidence, Procedure, and the Upside o.fCognitive Error, 57 
STAN. L. REv. 291, 312 (2004). 
3. Cultural Bias 
In evaluating demeanor evidence, judges must be sensitive to cultural differences, as well. 
Some groups, for example, may consider looking one directly in the eye as disrespectful or 
immodest. 
4. Angry Witnesses 
Some empirical evidence suggests that judges may discredit the testimony of a witness 
who demonstrates anger at the opposing party. A natural tendency to write off the angry person's 
testimony as exaggerated and vindictive does not take into account that the party's anger may 
have been a necessary impetus to enable him or her to have the courage to stand up for himself or 
herself See Laurie S. Kohn, Barriers to Reliable Credibility Assessments: Domestic Violence 
Victim-Witnesses, 11 AM. UJ. GENDER SOc. POL'y & L. 733 (2003) (judges expect victim to be 
demure and fearful, rather than angry and bitter). 
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5. Fact that Imperfect Doesn't Mean Either that It is Worthless or that 
It is Going Away 
[S]ince observation of such "demeanor evidence" is open to a trier of the 
facts when witnesses testify orally in his presence, and since such observation is 
not open to a reviewing tribunal, the fact-trier's findings, to the extent that they 
comprise direct or "'testimonial" inferences, are ordinarily unreviewable. 
True, demeanor evidence may sometimes mislead; but our courts regard it 
nevertheless as an excellent clue to the trustworthiness of testimony. 
NLRB v. Dinion Coil Co., 201 F.2d 484, 487 (2d Cir. 1952). See Jeremy A. Blumenthal, A Wipe 
of the Hands, a Lick of the Lips: The Validity of Demeanor Evidence in Assessing Witness 
Credibility, 72 NEB. L. REV. 1157, 1188 (1993) ("It is clear that demeanor evidence is a barnacle 
firmly fastened to numerous areas of the judicial system."). 
D. "Testimonial" vs. "Derivative" Inferences 
Agency decision-makers after an ALJ's proposed decision I do not defer to the ALJ's 
non-testimonial, non-demeanor assessments of credibility, on the ground that as to these, the 
ALl has no "advantage in logically evaluating such evidence." Fuller d/b/a Lewisville Flooring 
Co., 108 NLRB 1442, 1444 n.3 (1954). Accord, e.g, Butera v. Apfel, 173 F.3d 1049, 1055-56 
(7th Cir. 1996); Kopack v. NLRB, 668 F.2d 946, 953-54 (7th Cir. 1982); Penasquitos Village, 
Inc. v. NLRB, 565 F.2d 1074, 1078-79 (9th Cir. 1977); NLRB v. Dinion Coil Co., 201 F.2d 484, 
487 (2d Cir. 1952): 
See American Tobacco Co. v. The Katingo Hadjipatera, 194 F.2d 
449,451 (2d. Cir. 1951): "We accept, as we must, those of the 
trial judge's inferences of fact which he drew directly from his 
estimates of the credibility of witnesses whom he observed as 
they testified in his presence, i.e., his inferences (sometimes 
called 'testimonial inferences') that certain facts existed because 
he believed some witness or witnesses who testified before him 
that those facts did exist. We are not required, however, to 
accept a trial judge's findings, based not on facts to which a 
witness testified orally, but only on secondary or derivative 
inferences from the facts which the trial judge directly inferred 
I An ALl's decisions may be either "proposed" or "final" agency decisions. See, e.g, 
Md. State Gov't Code Ann. § 10-207(a)(1)-(2) (under this Administrative Procedure Act 
[derived from the 1961 version of the model act] a state agency "may delegate to the [Office of 
Administrative Hearings] the authority that the agency ... has to hear particular contested cases" 
and even "the authority to issue the final administrative decision of the agency in a contested 
case"). 
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from such testimony. We may disregard such a finding of facts 
thus derivatively inferred, if other rational derivative 
inferences are open. And we must disregard such a finding 
when the derivative inference either is not rational or has but a 
flimsy foundation in the testimony."; 
Consumer Protection Div. v. Morgan, 387 Md. 125, 197-201,874 A.2d 919 (2005); Community 
Clinic, Inc. v. Department of Health & Mental Hygiene, 174 Md. App. 526, 546-48, 922 A.2d 
607,618-20 (2007): 
Based on ... specific findings of fact, the ALJ concluded that 
appellants' administrative costs ... were reasonable. * * * 
Assuming ... that reasonableness in this case is a question of 
fact, that determination is, nevertheless, a matter of inference 
to be drawn from all of the primary facts in the record. Where, 
as here, a hearing officer and the final decision-maker in an agency 
differ with respect to a question of fact, Maryland cases recognize a 
distinction between credibility-based determinations of fact and 
inferences drawn from primary facts. 
Judge Motz (now ajudge of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Judicial Circuit), writing for this Court in 
Department of Health & Mental Hygiene v. Shrieves, 100 Md. 
App. 283, 641 A.2d 899 (1994) [which also quoted favorably from 
Penasquitos Village], clearly articulated the distinction. 
"[W]hen an administrative agency overrules the 
recommendation of an ALJ, a reviewing court's task is to 
determine if the agency's final order is based on substantial 
evidence in the record. In making this judgment, the ALJ's 
findings are, of course, part of the record and are to be 
considered along with the other portions of the record. Moreover, 
where credibility is pivotal to the agency's final order, ALJ's 
findings based on the demeanor of witnesses are entitled to 
substantial deference and can be rejected by the agency only if 
it gives strong reasons for doing so. If, however, after giving 
appropriate deference to the ALJ's demeanor-based findings 
there is sufficient evidence in the record to support both the 
decision of the ALJ and that of the agency, the agency's final 
order is to be affirmed-even if a court might have reached the 
opposite conclusion. This approach preserves the rightful roles 
of the ALJ, the agency, and the reviewing court: it gives special 
deference to both the ALJ's demeanor-based credibility 
determinations and to the agency's authority in making other 
-11-
factual findings and properly limits the role of the reviewing 
court." 
* * * 
Consequently, in the instant matter, the Secretary was not 
restrained by the recommended conclusion drawn by the ALl; 
rather, the Secretary was free to make the determinative inference, 
based on the entire record, that the excess costs were unreasonable, 
if that inference was supported by substantial evidence; 
State Board of Physicians v. Bernstein, 167 Md. App. 714, 894 A.2d 621 (2006): 
Here, the ALl stated several times in her proposed decision that 
the appellee's expert witnesses were credible, and that they were 
more credible than the Board's expert witnesses. The reasons she 
gave to support her credibility findings did not involve demeanor, 
however. Clearly, the ALJ found the appellee's experts to be 
more experienced, more proficient, more knowledgeable, and 
more objective than the Board's witnesses, and determined on 
those bases that their opinions were sound and correct, and were 
"'persuasive" and "credible." She said nothing to indicate that the 
outward appearances of the expert witnesses as they testified 
played a part in her credibility evaluations of their testimony. By 
her own account of her evaluation of the evidence, the ALJ did 
not place any importance upon the demeanor of the expert 
witnesses in deciding which of them was more credible in their 
testimony. * * * [T]he Board may make its own decisions about 
bias, interest, credentials of expert witnesses, the logic and 
persuasiveness of their testimony, and the weight to be given 
their opinions. (emphasis added); 
State Comm 'n on Human Relations v. Kaydon Ring & Seal, Inc., 149 Md. App. 666, 688-703, 
818 A.2d 259, 272-80 (2003); Gabaldoni v. Board of Physician Quality Assurance, 141 Md. 
App. 259, 785 A.2d 771 (2001). 
IV. Standard of Review 
Appropriate deference to the hearing judges has desirable results: it makes more probable 
the finality of their decisions and enhances respect for and confidence in them. See Olin G. 
Wellborn, Demeanor, 76 CORNELL L. REv. lO75, 1095-96 (1991). When the ALJ's are 
independent of the agency, its deference to the ALJ greatly increases the public's 
confidence in the fairness of the process. 
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In Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 424 (1951), the United States Supreme 
Court held that, upon judicial review, an agency's decision must be upheld as long as there is 
"substantial evidence" to support it in the record. The Court made clear that under both the 
Administrative Procedure Act and the Taft-Hartley Act, "substantial evidence" may not be shown 
by looking at the evidence supporting the agency decision in isolation; the record must be 
evaluated as a whole, and the ALJ's (examiner's) report must be considered as part of that 
record). Justice Frankfurter, writing for the Court, explained: 
Id. at 496-97. 
We do not require that the examiner's findings be given more 
weight than in reason and in the light of judicial experience they 
deserve. The "substantial evidence" standard is not modified in 
any way when the Board and its examiner disagree. We intend 
only to recognize that evidence supporting a conclusion may be 
less substantial when an impartial, experienced examiner who 
has observed the witnesses and lived with the case has drawn 
conclusions different from the Board's than when he has reached 
the same conclusion. The findings of the examiner are to be 
considered along with the consistency and inherent probability 
of testimony. The significance of his report, of course, depends 
largely on the importance of credibility in the particular case. 
To give it this significance does not seem to us materially more 
difficult than to heed the other facts which in sum determine 
whether evidence is "substantial." 
On remand, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit said that the 
NLRB must not reject the findings of an Examiner based directly upon the "bearing and 
delivery" of witnesses who orally testified before him, absent "a very substantial 
preponderance in the testimony as recorded." NLRB v. Universal Camera Corp., 190 F.2d 
429,430 (2d Cir. 1951). In Dinion Coil, 201 F.2d at 490, one year later, the same court said that 
it: 
"surely may not upset the Board when it accepts a finding of an 
Examiner which is grounded upon (a) his disbelief in an orally 
testifying witness' testimony because of the witness' demeanor 
or (b) the Examiner's evaluation of oral testimony as reliable, 
unless on its face it is hopelessly incredible - cf GindorfJ v. 
Prince, 189 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1951) [finding clear error in trial 
court's crediting of a $62/week clerk's testimony, without any 
documentary support, that on short acquaintance an aged 
multimillionaire had him continue his clerk's job but also take over 
direction of the older gentleman's financial empire] - or flatly 
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contradicts either a so-called 'law of nature' or undisputed 
documentary authority - cf Orvis v. Higgins, 180 F.2d 537 (2d 
Cir. 1950) [finding clear error where trial judge's decision was 
based on no affirmative evidence and conflicted with "the actually 
irresistible inference drawn from the undisputed facts"]' 
State law follows suit. For example, Md. State Gov't Code Ann. § 10-215(g)(v)-(vi) 
provides in part that a circuit court may reverse or modify a final agency decision if it "is 
unsupported by competent, material, and substantial evidence in light of the entire record 
as submitted." 
In Anderson v. Department of Public Safety & Correctional Servs., 330 Md. 187,212, 
623 A,2d 198, 210 (1993), the Court of Appeals of Maryland was mindful of the fact that it 
'''should [not] substitute its judgment for the expertise of those persons who constitute the 
administrative agency from which the appeal is taken'" and that "'judicial review essentially 
should be limited to whether a reasoning mind reasonably could have reached the factual 
conclusion the agency reached. This need not and must not be either judicial fact-finding or a 
substitution of judicial judgment for agency judgment. '" The Anderson court distinguished 
judicial review of administrative action from appellate review of a trial court judgment in another 
way, as well: 
In the latter context the appellate court will search the record for 
evidence to support the judgment and will sustain the judgment for 
a reason plainly appearing on the record whether or not the reason 
was expressly relied upon by the trial court. However, in judicial 
review of agency action the court may not uphold the agency 
order unless it is sustainable on the agency's findings and for 
the reasons stated by the agency. 
Id. at 213,623 A,2d at 211. 
In Anderson, the Secretary had reached factual findings contrary to the ALl's without 
readily ascertainable "substantial evidence" to support them. Stressing the significance of the 
credibility of conflicting witnesses in the case before it, and the fact that "[o]ne of the main 
objectives of the Legislature in establishing the OAH was to provide an impartial hearing 
officer [not employed by or under the control of the agency] in contested cases," id. at 213-
14,623 A.2d at 211, it concluded that the agency's decision must be reversed and remanded, so 
that the Secretary could reconsider her order. 
We think that the credibility of the witnesses was of the utmost 
importance in the circumstances here; it played a dominant role; it 
was pivotaL But there is no indication that the [Secretary] gave 
any deference to the ALJ's assessment of the credibility of the 
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witnesses before him. And she gave no strong reasons for 
rejecting the ALJ's assessments of credibility. It seems that the 
[Secretary] made her own findings of fact, as suggested by the 
representative of the Penitentiary, and it appears that she did not 
take into account in making them the factual findings of the AU. 
Therefore, we believe that the Circuit Court for Baltimore City 
was wrong when it found that there was substantial evidence to 
support the order of the [Secretary], because the [Secretary] 
did not appreciate the proper relationship between her and the 
ALJ. The [Secretary] must reconsider her order in the light of 
what we have found to be the interrelation between her function 
and the function of the ALl. We vacate the judgment of the Circuit 
Court for Baltimore City and remand the case to it with direction to 
remand the case to the [Department of Personnel] for further 
proceedings in accordance with this opinion. 
Id. at 219,623 A.2d at 204. 
The Anderson court quoted with approval from 1 Charles H. Koch, lr., Administrative 
Law and Practice (1985), § 6.73, p. 520: 
"{T}he credibility findings of the person who sees and hears the 
witnesses-be he ALl, juror or judge-is entitled to considerable 
deference. While the degree of deference due the ALJ's final 
decision is related to the importance of credibility in a 
particular case, the ALl's decision to give or deny credit should 
not be reversed absent an adequate explanation of the grounds/or 
the reviewing body's source of disagreement with the ALJ In sum, 
the review authority has the power to reject [demeanor-based] 
credibility assessments only if it gives strong reasons for doing 
so." 
330 Md. at 217, 623 A.2d at 213 (emphasis added). 
As explained in Maryland Bd. of Physicians v. Elliott, 170 Md. App. 369, 387-96,415-
23,430-31,907 A.2d 321 (2006): 
The Anderson-Shrieves Deference Rule is of limited utility. It is a 
small wrinkle on the substantial evidence test. It does not apply to 
an ALl's proposed decisions or conclusions of law. It does not 
apply to an ALl's proposed findings of fact that are based on 
derivative inferences. It does not apply even to the assessment of 
credibility, when the credibility assessment is not primarily 
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demeanor-based but is based on, as is frequently the case with 
expert witnesses, technical knowledge or specialized practices 
that implicate the expertise of the reviewing agency. It does not 
apply even to demeanor-based credibility findings if the reviewing 
agency has other substantial evidence supporting its decision to 
disregard the proposed findings of the ALJ. In the limited 
circumstances in which it does apply, ti still does not necessarily 
bind the agency. It simply imposes upon the agency the additional 
burden of articulating a sound reason for not accepting the 
demeanor-based fact-finding of the ALl. 
See also Penasquitos Village, Inc. v. NLRB, 565 F.2d 1074, 1078-79 (9th Cir. 1977) (through the 
substantial evidence test, "Deference is accorded the Board's factual conclusions for a different 
reason Board members are presumed to have broad experience and expertise in labor-
management relations. Further, it is the Board to which Congress has delegated administration 
of the Act. The Board, therefore, is viewed as particularly capable of drawing inferences from 
the facts of a labor dispute. Accordingly, it has been said that a Court of Appeals must abide 
by the Board's derivative inferences, if drawn from not discredited testimony, unless those 
inferences are 'irrational. ''') (citations omitted). 
V. "Make the Record Sing" 
The greater the extent to which an ALJ articulates that he or she is basing a 
credibility determination at least in part on demeanor, the greater the deference that is 
likely to be given that determination. See Beverly Cal. Corp. v. NLRB, 227 F.3d 817, 829 (7th 
Cir. 2000) ("Arguments to the dIect that the ALl should not have found certain witnesses to be 
credible are, to put it bluntly, almost never worth making.") 
A. Rarely, If Ever, Does a Case Hinge on Demeanor Evidence Alone 
Judge Dunaway, concurring in part and dissenting in part in Penasquitos Village, 565 
F.2d at 1086, expressed this opinion: 
I doubt if there are many cases in which the fact finder relies on 
demeanor alone. There may not be any; I hope that there are none. 
I think that in every case in which he thinks about what he is doing, 
the fact finder should and does consider both the demeanor of 
the witness and what he says, the content of his testimony, and 
weighs those factors in relation to the fact finder's knowledge 
of life's realities, the internal consistency of what the witness is 
saying, and its consistency, or lack of it, with the other 
evidence in the case, testimonial, documentary, and physical. 
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An example of such a combined evaluation may be found in Getahun v. US. INS, 1999 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 1 0860 (4th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (unpublished): 
Noting a number of inconsistences, vague areas, and 
implausibilities in [petitioner] Getahun's testimony, the absence of 
evidence or documents to corroborate her testimony and the failure 
to show such were unavailable, and Getahun's seemingly defiant 
demeanor, the [Immigration Judge] found that Getahun was not a 
credible witness. The [Immigration Judge] further stated that 
Getahun did not appear to be forthright, her testimony was 
constricted and limited to the bare minimum in her responses, and 
her testimony was vague and evasive. Due to these findings, the 
[Immigration Judge] stated that she could not credit Getahun's 
testimony. 
B. Need for Record to Be Explicit 
1. The ALJ Should Articulate His or Her Grounds for Crediting or 
Discrediting Particular Evidence 
If an ALl bases his or her decision on a finding of demeanor-based credibility, the ALl 
must so state on the record, or the agency and/or the reversing court cannot defer to the ALl 
E.g., Ceguerra v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 933 F.2d 735,738,741 (9th Cir. 1991) 
(citations omitted): 
The district court erred by deferring to the ALl's opportunity to 
evaluate the credibility of the witnesses. In appropriate cases, 
administrative law judges may base their conclusion on a 
determination that witnesses did not testify credibly. They cannot, 
however, tacitly reject a witness's testimony as not credible. 
When the decision of an ALJ rests on a negative credibility 
evaluation, the ALJ must make findings on the record and 
must support those findings by pointing to substantial evidence 
on the record. 
Napoleon Ceguerra was the only witness at the hearing. 
The ALJ in this case did not find that the testimony lacked 
credibility. Because the ALJ made no findings to suggest that 
he did not believe Napoleon Ceguerra, the ALJ's opportunity 
to observe demeanor provides no grounds for affirming. 
Rejection of a witness's positive testimony must be supported by "a 'specific, cogent 
reason.'" Figeroa v. US INS, 886 F.2d 76, 78-79 (4th Cir. 1989). See See v. Washington 
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Metro. Area Transit Auth., 36 F.3d 375, 382-86 (4th Cir. 1994) (deference to ALl, where duty to 
assess credibility is "nondelegable," but which will not be adequately supported by "'merely and 
conclusory" and uncorroborated findings); David S. Buckel, Penalizing the Failure to Make 
Proper Credibility Findings in Disability Cases, 23 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 945 (1989) (decisions 
of Second and Ninth Circuits hold that pain testimony of Social Security disability claimant 
will be taken as true, as will uncontroverted expert physician's testimony, unless agency 
has made proper adverse findings regarding credibility); James P. Timony, Demeanor 
Credibility (Witness Truth-Telling), 49 CATH. U. L. REV. 903,927-28 & nn. 118-23 (2000) 
(proper basis is not ALl's observations as to whether claimant appears to be in pain); Md. State 
Gov't Code Ann. § 10-214(b) (a final decision in a contested case must state findings of fact, 
with a concise and explicit statement of supporting facts, and conclusions of law). Cf State 
Comm 'n on Human Relations v. Kaydon Ring & Seal, Inc .. , 149 Md. App. 666, 705, 818 A.2d 
259,282-83 (2003) (where an ALJ did not make a credibility determination resolving the 
conflicting testimony in a crucial fact, the agency should remand the matter to the ALJ). 
2. The Difficulty of Analyzing and Recounting Demeanor Evidence and 
Its Impact 
How much should we require ALJ's to put on the record? Can a judge adequately 
and accurately record and express her evaluations based on demeanor, other than in a 
most conclusory form? As the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit explained 
in Dinion Coil Co., 201 F.2d at 488, 90, there are no rules to follow but those of experience: 
"[M]ethods of evaluating the credibility of oral testimony do 
not lend themselves to formulations in terms of rules and are 
thus, inescapably, 'un-ruly.' In his brilliant discussion of evidence, 
Sir James Stephen illuminated the difficult task of a trial judge 
who, observing a witness in the brief period when the witness 
appears in court, tries to ascertain how far the witness' 'powers of 
observation and memory * * * enable him to tell the truth' and 
'how far the innumerable motives, by anyone of which he may be 
activated, dispose him' to do so. 'No rules of evidence * * * can 
perceptibly affect this difficulty,' Stephen remarked. 'Judges (i.e., 
trial judges) must deal with it as well as they can by the use of 
their natural faculties and acquired experience, and the 
miscarriages of justice in which they will be involved by reason of 
it must be set down to the imperfection of our means of arriving at 
truth. * * * Insofar as [this power of discernment] can be 
acquired at all, it is to be acquired only by experience, for the 
acquisition of which the position of a judge is by no means 
peculiarly favourable. * * * Such observations are seldom, if ever 
thrown by those who make them into the form of express 
propositions. Indeed, for obvious reasons, it would be impossible 
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to do so. The most acute observer would never be able to 
catalogue the tones of voice, the passing shades of expression or 
the unconscious gestures which he had learnt to associate with 
falsehood; and if he did, his observations would probably be of 
little use to others. Every man must learn matters of this sort of 
himself, and though no sort of knowledge is so important to a 
judge, no rules can be laid down for its acquisition. * * * No 
process is gone through, the correctness of which can be 
independently tested. The judge has nothing to trust but his own 
nature and acquired sagacity.' Sir Henry Maine agreed with 
Stephen. He said that there are no 'rules to guide' a "judge of the 
Fact' in 'drawing inferences from the assertion of a witness to the 
existence of the facts asserted by him.' * * * [I]t is the rarest and 
highest personal accomplishment of a judge to make allowance for 
the ignorance and timidity of witnesses, and to see through the 
confident and plausible liar. * * * This lack of rules ('un-
ruliness'), with its concomitant wide discretion in the fact-trier, 
yields inherent difficulties not surmountable by a reviewing court, 
regardless of whether the fact-trier by a judge, a jury, or a trial 
exammer. 
3. Damned If You Don't and Damned If You Do - Striving for that 
Perfect Medium 
As NLRB Trial Examiner Henry S. Sahm has explained, the general statement of an 
evaluation based on a "observation of the witnesses" has been held insufficient: 
It is often quite difficult, if not impossible in some 
instances, to describe by the written word the impressions 
derived from observing a witness testify. Impressions are 
extremely difficult to imprison within any form of words. Not only 
would it not serve any useful purpose but it would unduly prolong 
and add nothing to a decision to describe a witness as having a 
furtive look, a nervous twitch, a flushed face or perspiring freely. 
Those indicia are better left unsaid in the hope that judgment as to 
such matters should be left to the sense and experience of the one 
who observed the witnesses, guided, of course, by acceptable 
standards. 
However, the Labor Board in two recent cases, Allied 
Chain Link Fence Co., 126 NLRB No. 74 and Buckley 
Development Co., 126 NLRB No. 147, indicates that examiners 
must, in the future, spell out in detail, the indicia upon which they 
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believe one witness as against another. In both those cases the 
Board reversed the examiners' credibility resolutions because 
they did not rest their evaluation of the witnesses' credibility on 
"demeanor." Both examiners merely prefaced their conclusions 
by stating that they based their credibility findings on their 
"observation of the witnesses." Evidently, this is not sufficient. 
It would appear that in evaluating a witness' testimony in terms of 
demeanor evidence, the Board will require examiners to delineate 
specifically the impressions derived from observing the witness 
testify. 
Henry S. Sahm, Demeanor Evidence: Elusive and intangible imponderables, 47 A.B.A. J. 580, 
582 (l961). See Briggs v. Massanari, 248 F.3d 1235 (lOth Cir. 2001) (reversing ALJ's decision) 
("Although the ALJ need not discuss all of the evidence in the record, he may not ignore 
evidence [here, test results] that does not support his decision, especially when that evidence is 
'significantly probative.' * * * The ALJ deemed the testimony of Johnny [the childhood 
disability claimant] 'and his mother unconvincing, not substantiated by objective medical 
findings, and credible only to the extent that claimant's impairments have not produced marked 
and severe limitations.' 'Credibility determinations are peculiarly the province of the finder 
of fact, and we will not upset such determinations when supported by substantial evidence.' 
In the present case, we must view the ALJ's determination with skepticism. A significant 
portion of the record evidence supports the testimony, and the ALJ must explain why he has 
determined that the testimony is not credible. Standard boilerplate language will not suffice. 
Evaluation of Symptoms in Disability Claims, 1996 WL 374186, at *4 (stating that credibility 
determinations cannot be based on intangible or intuitive reasons; rather they 'must be grounded 
in the evidence and articulated in the determination or decision '); see also Kepler v. Chater, 68 
F.3d 387, 391 (lOth Cir. 1995) (stating that a credibility determination 'should be closely and 
affirmatively linked to substantial evidence and not just a conclusion in the guise of findings') 
(quotation omitted)") (some citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
Yet a judge who specifically and irrationally relies on a physical trait is likely to be 
reversed: 
Without doubt, the result of our procedure is to vest the trial judge 
with immense power not subject to correction even if misused: His 
estimate of an orally testifying witness' credibility may stem from 
the trial judge's application of an absurd rule-of-thumb, such as 
that when a witness wipes his hands during his testimony, 
unquestionably he is lying; but, unless the judge reveals of record 
that he used such an irrational test of credibility, an upper court can 
do nothing to correct his error. 
Broadcast Music v. Havana Madrid Restaurant Corp., 175 F.2d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 1949). 
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No doubt for these reasons Chief ALJ Timony of the FTC advises the description of 
demeanor evidence determinations as "behavioral conclusions" (e.g., "'recalcitrance and 
obvious reluctance' to answer questions, 'sudden lapse[s] of memory,' or 'hesitant and 
noncommital,'" frank, sincere, or straightforward, rather than "physical descriptions" 
(e.g., twitching, stuttering, sweating, or blinking"). James P. Timony, Demeanor Credibility 
(Witness Truth-Telling), 49 CATH. U. L. REV. 906, 928 (2000). 
Butera v. Apfel, 173 F.3d 1049, 1055-56 (7th Cir. 1996) provides a good example of an 
ALl's persuasive reasoning regarding testimonial (and derivative, based on character) inferences: 
While the ALJ found that Butera experienced some pain that 
would prevent him from performing heavier work, he specifically 
detailed a number of reasons for disbelieving Butera's 
description of the degree of functional limitation he was 
experiencing: (1) Butera was vague and evasive in answering 
questions; (2) Butera was hesitant and indefinite in describing 
the character, severity, and location of his pain; and (3) Butera 
declined, for reasons unknown, to volunteer any information 
about his work history, forcing the ALJ to ask detailed 
questions which revealed that Butera had been imprisoned on 
a burglary conviction and had been assessed interest and 
penalties for income tax evasion. The ALl's credibility 
determination of Butera, based on these three factors, is precisely 
the sort of determination that this Court has recognized is 
entitled to particular deference as it "involve[ s] intangible and 
unarticulable elements which impress the ALJ, that, unfortunately 
leave 'no trace that can be discerned in this or any other transcript." 
[W]e are of the opinion that the ALJ reasonably determined that 
the evidence as a whole did not lend credibility to Butera's 
assertion that he was "disabled" and completely unable to work as 
a result of back and leg pain. 
4. Example: How to Credit Absence of Records: Negative Evidence v. 
Affirmative Evidence? 
Cf Armstead v. US Dept. of HUD, 815 F.2d 278, 282 (3d Cir. 1987) (over dissent of 1. 
Hunter) ("After declining her request to accept an assignment of her mortgage, the Department 
of Housing and Urban Development told plaintiff that she could have a face-to-face 
conference with an agency official if she telephoned for an appointment. In an affidavit 
plaintiff stated that she did call the agency, but was dissuaded from further action by the 
unidentified [female] who answered the phone. Relying on the fact that its records contain 
no notation of the call [though its employees are supposed to make such records, but not having 
canvassed its female employees reachable at that telephone number], the agency refused a 
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renewed request for a conference. We conclude that by failing to credit the plaintiffs 
uncontradicted affidavit in denying this de minimis accommodation, the agency action was 
arbitrary and capricious."). 
VI. Effect of New Technology 
Given the research concluding that auditory cues are more reliable than visual, do audio-
taped records give the reviewing agency or court as much insight as the ALJ? 
Judge Frank, in a "1984"-type reference in 1949, supra page 7, said, "Only were we to 
have 'talking movies' of trials would" a '''rehearing court'" be a "'reseeing court. '" Do video-
technological advances make that available? See James P. Timony, Demeanor Credibility 
(Witness Truth-Telling), 49 CATH. U. L. REv. 903, 914-15 (2000). If so, would the reviewing 
agency eclipse the role of the ALJ? 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 43(a) (with style changes, effective December 1,2007, absent contrary 
congressional action), provides for the option of "long distance" live testimony: 
At trial, the witnesses' testimony must be taken in open court 
unless a federal statute, the Federal Rules of Evidence, these rules, 
or other rules adopted by the Supreme Court provide otherwise. 
For good cause in compelling circumstances and with appropriate 
safeguards, the court may permit testimony in open court by 
contemporaneous transmission from a different location. 
Some agencies already use telephone hearings. James P. Timony, Demeanor Credibility 
(Witness Truth-Telling), 49 CATH. U. L. REV. 903, 915-16 (2000). Due process challenges have 
been raised: 
Compare Gray Panthers v. Schweiker, 716 F.2d 23,37-38 (D.C. 
Cir. 1983 ) (ordering the district court to examine the class of 
Medicare claims under $100 to determine if credibility was 
involved and suggesting that in the minority of cases where 
credibility was determinative, telephone hearings may violate due 
process rights), with Casey v. o 'Bannon, 536 F.Supp. 350, 353-54 
(E.D .Pa. 1982) (holding that a hearing officer's visual analysis is 
not a constitutional requirement and reasoning that the hearing 
officer "can effectively judge credibility over the phone by noting 
voice responses, pauses, [and] levels of irritation"); see also Bigby 
v. INS, 21 F.3d 1059, 1064 (lIth Cir. 1994)(holding that "when 
credibility determinations are not in issue, an [administrative law] 
judge may hold a hearing by telephonic means").). 
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Id. at 916 n.56. 
VII. Examples of Cases Where ALJ's Decision re: Credibility Upheld by Court 
A. Instances Where Agency Had Wrongly Rejected ALJ's Findings 
• Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 71 S.Ct, 456 (1951), on remand, NLRB 
v. Universal Camera Corp., 190 F.2d 429 (1951) (hearing examiner -.. rejected by NLRB 
-.. Board aff'd by Court of Appeals -.. Court of Appeals rev'd by S.Ct. -.. Board was then 
rev'd by Court of Appeals, which considered itself, under the facts of the case, in as good 
a position as was the Board to evaluate the record, and held that Board had wrongly 
disregarded Examiner's demeanor-based findings) (see supra p. 13). 
• Haebe v. Department of Justice, 288 F.3d 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (ALJ found for 
discharged DEA agent -.. Merit Systems Protection Board rev'd -.. Board was rev'd by 
Court of Appeals) ("The AJ's twenty-page opinion reflects a three-day hearing and 
extensive consideration and discussion of disputed issues that the AJ resolved in large 
measure based on his assessment of the credibility and demeanor of the various witnesses 
who testified," The ALJ found the agent to have an "extraordinarily" fine reputation for 
honesty, integrity, and devotion to duty; and that, based on the confidential informant's 
demeanor, his testimony supporting the agent was "honest and credible." '''When ... 
the AJ's finding is explicitly or implicitly based on the demeanor of a witness, the 
board may not simply disagree with the AJ's assessment of credibility .... If the 
board reverses such a finding, we will not sustain its decision on appeal unless the 
board has articulated sound reasons, based on the record, for its contrary 
evaluation of the testimonial evidence. '" Such sound reasons were lacking here. 
"When the demeanor-based deference requirement is not in play, the MSPB is free 
to re-weigh the evidence and substitute its own decision as to the facts or the law 
commensurate with the substantial evidence standard, but it cannot substitute its 
judgment on issues of credibility based on the demeanor of witnesses."). 
• DantJ'an, Inc. v. Department of Labor, 171 F.3d 58 (1 st Cir. 1999) (ALJ rejected 
Secretary's request to bar contractor from doing business with government -.. Admin. 
Review Board authorized debarment -.. district court aff d -.. Court of Appeals rev'd 
Board) (Court of Appeals' decision was largely based on an interpretation of the 
law, which conflicted with the Secretary's, but also on ALJ's demeanor evaluation; 
ALJ noted that where the testimony conflicted, he found contractor's principal "more 
'credible, persuasive and probative"'; under applicable statutory scheme, ARB's review 
was limited to correction of clear error). 
• Willbanks v. Secretary of HHS, 847 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (AU found 
disability benefits were appropriate as of January 1976 -.. Appeals Council rejected that 
date -.. district court aff d -.. court of appeals rev'd) ("In the instant case, establishing 
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substantial evidence involves carefully evaluating the credibility of Willbanks and his 
mother, the testimony of various medical experts and the sparse medical data. We think 
the ALJ's opportunity to observe the demeanor of Willbanks and his mother, to 
evaluate what they said in light of how they said it, and to consider how it fit with 
the rest of the evidence was invaluable and should not have been discarded as lightly 
as the Appeals Council discarded it. Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535,545 (6th Cir. 
1986) (en banc). This is especially so since the Appeals Council's findings conflict with 
the findings of an ALJ who has been intimately involved with a case."). 
• Aylett v. Secretary of HUD, 54 F.3d 1560 (10th Cir. 1995) (ALJ found no racial 
discrimination ~HUD rejected AU's credibility findings and found Fair Housing Act 
violated ~ Court of Appeals reversed HUD's decision as being "'thin at best, if it 
can be regarded as more than speculative''') ("ALJ had found landlady's son "to be the 
'most credible witness' and 'the only eyewitness to the conversion': 'Based on my 
observation of his demeanor, I found him to be very frank and sincere. Despite the fact 
that he is a Respondent and Ms. Aylett's son, I found his testimony to be very convincing. 
Thus, I place great weight on his eyewitness testimony that Ms. Aylett did not make the 
alleged statement.' The AU further found Barbara Aylett's testimony to be 'credible' 
and stated: 'Based on my observation of Ms. Aylett's demeanor, I found her testimony to 
be very sincere.' Finally, the ALJ concluded that 'based on my observation of [the 
landlord's] demeanor, I found him to be very believable.' Although the ALJ did not find 
[the complainant, who bore the burden of persuasion] and her daughter to be incredible, 
he detennined that their testimony was 'simply not more believable than that of Ms. 
Aylett and [her son]."') ("heightened scrutiny" ofthe agency's decision applies when 
it has rejected, rather than affirmed, an ALJ's assessment of witness credibility"). 
• Penasquitos Village, Inc. v. NLRB, 565 F.2d 1074 (9th Cir. 1977) (ALJ ~ rev'd by 
NLRB ~ NLRB rev'd by Court of Appeals) (Board had based its decision solely on 
testimony that had been discredited - here "by clear implication" - by the ALJ 
who "believed Zamora, whom he characterized 'as an honest and forthright witness,' and 
disbelieved Ruiz, whose testimony he characterized as 'equivocal'" and described Rios as 
having "fabricated facts" and as having demonstrated "animosity toward Zamora" during 
his testimony; the Board's special expertise in labor-management relations gave it no 
upper hand on this question of testimonial inferences). 
• Anderson v. Department of Public Safety & Correctional Servs., 330 Md. 187,623 A.2d 
198 (1993) (penitentiary guard charged with excessive force and suspended without pay 
after a preliminary hearing ~ ALJ proposed that officer be reinstated ~ Secretary's 
designee reviewed record, including taped proceeding, before ALJ and heard 
arguments and rejected ALJ's proposal ~ Circuit Court afl'd order of separation ~ 
Court of Appeals took case from Court of Special Appeals and rev'd and remanded 
Secretary's decision as it did not adequately take into account the ALJ's 
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assessments as to credibility of the witnesses and gave "no strong reasons for 
rejecting" them). 
B. Instances Where No Conflict Between Agency and ALJ's Findings 
• Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853 (9th Cir. 2001) (over dissent of Ferguson, J.) (ALJ 
denied claim for disability benefits to claimant who had fibromyalgia - Appeals Council 
denied review - magistrate judge affd - court of appeals affd) (The ALJ provided 
'''specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record" 
for rejecting testimony of claimant's treating physician; the ALJ found the doctor's 
testimony contradicted by his written records and "so extreme as to be implausible"; 
likewise the ALJ "stated sufficient specific reasons for not fully crediting [claimant's] 
pain testimony. For example, the AU noted that when Rollins was discharged from the 
Behavioral Medicine Center of Lorna Linda University Medical Center after treatment for 
addiction to painkillers, the doctors discharging her said that she had 'no restrictions on 
activity' and gave her a Global Assessment of Function level of 70, 'indicating only mild 
symptoms and generally quite adequate function.' While subjective pain testimony 
cannot be rejected on the sole ground that it is not fully corroborated by objective medical 
evidence, the medical evidence is still a relevant factor in determining the severity of the 
claimant's pain and its disabling effects. 20 C.F.R. § 404. 1529(c)(2). The AU also 
pointed out ways in which Rollins' claim to have totally disabling pain was undermined 
by her own testimony about her daily activities, such as attending to the needs of her two 
young children, cooking, housekeeping, laundry, shopping, attending therapy and various 
other meetings every week, and so forth. For example, in her daily activities 
questionnaire, Rollins stated that she attended to "all of [her 1 children's needs; meals, 
bathing, emotional, discipline, etc." because her husband worked six days a week, usually 
from early in the morning until 10 p.m. In the same questionnaire, she also stated that she 
left the house "daily" to go to places such as her son's school, taekwondo lessons and 
soccer games, doctor's appointments, and the grocery store. It is true that Rollins' 
testimony was somewhat equivocal about how regularly she was able to keep up with all 
of these activities, and the ALJ's interpretation of her testimony may not be the only 
reasonable one. But it is still a reasonable interpretation and is supported by 
substantial evidence; thus, it is not our role to second-guess it.") 
• Johnson v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1145 (8th Cir. 2001) (ALJ affd denial of disability benefits; 
district court aff d - court of appeals afr d) (ALJ articulated sufficient specific 
reasons, both testimonial and derivative, to reject claimant's and treating physician'S 
testimony). 
• NLRB v. Beverly Enters.-Mass., Inc., 174 F.3d 13,26 (1st Cir. 1999) (ALJ found 
violations ofNLRA - NLRB agreed with AU - Court of Appeals atrd) (ALJ's 
"implicit" resolution of credibility disputes meant that evidence cited by employer was 
not "uncontradicted"). 
-25-
• Getahun v. us. INS, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 10860 (4th Cir. 1999) (11 denied asylum 
request ~ Board of Immigration Appeals afT' d ~ Court of Appeals aff d) CALJ and 
Board provided "specific, cogent reasons" for discrediting petitioner, both as to 
testimonial and derivative matters). 
• Perdue Farms, Inc. v. NLRB, 144 F.3d 830, 838 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (ALJ found violations 
ofNLRA; Board agreed; court of appeals affd) C" , "[C]redibility determinations may 
not be overturned absent the most extraordinary circumstances such as utter 
disregard for sworn testimony or the acceptance of testimony which is on its fac[e] 
incredible." , " The ALJ 'credit[ ed] Smith's testimony that Williams did announce a 
change in the attendance system to a less severe method at the June 13 meeting.' While 
not expressly based upon observation of the witness's demeanor, the ALJ's decision 
to credit Smith's testimony reflected his consideration of conflicting testimony from 
Williams and Scarborough, as well as of Scarborough's June 30 memorandum. Although 
Smith admitted that his memory of the June 13 meeting was 'not good,' and although he 
needed to refresh his recollection before testifying, his testimony was neither incredible 
nor did it become so simply because he was not completely certain of every detail of 
the meeting. Because Perdue has failed to demonstrate 'extraordinary circumstances,' 
we decline to overturn the ALJ's decision to credit Smith's testimony.") (citations 
omitted). 
• Ostronski v. Chater, 94 F.3d 413 (8th Cir. 1996) (ALJ found disability benefits were 
properly denied by SSA ~ Appeals Council remanded ~after 2nd hearing, ALJ again 
held denial proper ~ district court aff d ~ court of appeals aff d) (ALJ had sufficient 
(derivative) reasons for discrediting claimant's physician's medical opinions; "The 
AU [also] properly considered the [lay] witness testimony and refused to place 
controlling weight on it for acceptable reasons. The ALJ noted that Ostronski's 
mother, sister, and husband were not qualified to render an opinion as to 
Ostronski's capacity to work; their statements merely corroborated Ostronski's 
testimony regarding her activities; and the testimony conflicted with the medical 
evidence regarding Ostronski's functional capabilities. Thus, the ALJ had a solid 
basis for discounting Ostronski's lay witness testimony. In these circumstances, the 
AU was not required to make credibility findings as to these witnesses in order to decide 
their testimony was not entitled to great weight."). 
• Cross Mountain Coal, Inc. v. Ward, 93 F.3d 211 (6th Cir. 1996) (ALJ awarded black lung 
benefits to claimant ~ Benefits Review Board afT' d ~ Court of Appeals afT'd) ("In 
deciding whether the substantial evidence requirement is satisfied, we consider 
whether the ALJ adequately explained the reasons for crediting certain testimony 
and evidence over other evidence in the record in deciding to either award or deny 
benefits. See Director, OWCP v. Congleton, 743 F.2d 428, 430 (6th Cir. 1984). Finally, 
when dealing with a claim for benefits, we must keep in mind that the Act is 
remedial in nature and must be liberally construed "to include the largest number of 
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miners as benefit recipients." Tussey v. Island Creek Coal Co., 982 F.2d 1036, 1042 (6th 
Cir. 1993)."). 
• NLRB v. Lakepark Indus., Inc., 919 F.2d 42 (6th Cir. 1990) (ALl found violations-" 
Board adopted ALl's report, with modifications -.. court of appeals affd) (the AU's 
"credibility findings are consistent with a reasonable reading of the record"). 
• NLRB v. Dinion Coil Co., 201 F.2d 484 (2d Cir. 1952) (unfair labor practice: firing 
employees because they were union members) (hearing examiner -.. NLRB agreed -.. 
Court of Appeals affd) (Trial Examiner had stated in his report: '''On the entire record, 
including his observation of the witnesses, the undersigned is not persuaded that 
[employee] was discharged by the [employer] for the reasons advanced by it. '" * * * 
"These facts constitute a sufficient foundation for a rational inference that [the 
employee's] union activity induced the discharge."). 
VIII. Examples of Cases Where ALJ's Findings Were Ultimately Rejected 
A. Where ALJ Relied on Demeanor Evidence 
• Be-La Stores v. NLRB, 126 F.3d 268 (4th Cir. 1997) (over 1. Ervin's dissent) (AU found 
some alleged NLRA violations existed and others did not, and issued a mandatory 
bargaining order (rather than an election) -.. Board both affirmed and reversed some of 
ALl's findings of violations but affirmed bargaining order -.. court of appeals rev'd) 
(ALJ explained, in a "perfunctory footnote," that he "credited" all of the Union's 37 
witnesses over all 43 of the employer's witnesses; "Where an ALl provides no more 
than a generalized, conclusory statement purportedly incorporating a host of individual 
comparative credibility determinations with respect to multiple witnesses, we refuse to 
indulge the presumption that its findings are entitled to the ordinary deference. Cf 
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. NLRB, 680 F.2d 974, 977 (4th Cir. 1982) ("We are not 
however, required to accept [the] AU's credibility determinations where they are not 
supported by substantial evidence."). Otherwise, savvy ALJ's could simply ground 
their judgments in broad, categorical statements that they credit all of one party's 
witnesses, and thereby effectively insulate their decisions from meaningful judicial 
review."). 
• NLRB v. New York-Keansburg-Long Branch Bus Co., 578 F.2d 472,477-78 (3d Cir. 
1978) (ALl found violations of NLRA -.. Board summarily aff d -.. Court of Appeals 
denied Board's petition for enforcement) ("The ALJ made his findings and reached his 
conclusions by relying almost exclusively on the testimonial, as distinct from the 
documentary, evidence presented by certain Union representatives. Even if the AU 
had properly credited this testimony, which we believe he did not, we would still find 
that: the inferences on which (his) findings were based were so overborne by 
evidence calling for contrary inferences that the findings of the (ALJ) could not, on 
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the consideration of the whole record, be deemed to be supported by 'substantial' 
evidence."). 
B. Where ALJ Relied on Derivative Inferences 
• Briscoe v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345 (7th Cir. 2005) (ALl rejected claim for disability 
benefits ~ Appeals Council denied review ~ district court rev'd and remanded for an 
award of benefits ~ court of appeals rev'd and remanded to SSA because ALJ had not 
included required "narrative discussion describing how the evidence supports each 
conclusion, citing specific medical facts" and record did not support ALl's conclusions, 
and ALl gave unsupported reasons for rejecting witness's testimony, such as that she did 
not give information for whom she was not asked). 
• Manda v. Director, Office of Workers 'Comp. Programs, 130 F.3d 579 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(ALl denied Black Lung survivor's benefits ~ Benefits Review Board afT'd ~ Court of 
Appeals rev'd and directed an award of benefits) (record supports only one conclusion: 
death caused by Black Lung disease; only evidence supporting ALJ was report of a 
non-testifying, non-treating physician; ALl's characterization of long-time treating 
physician's conclusion as based on "an assumption" did not suffice to discredit the 
doctor's "reasoned medical judgment"). 
• Kopack v. NLRB, 668 F.2d 946 (7th Cir. 1982) (ALl found improper threats and 
retaliatory discharges ~ rev'd in part by Board, which found discharges were not 
retaliatory ~ Board upheld by Court of Appeals) (portion of ALl's decision regarding 
threats "relied primarily on demeanor" and was affirmed by Board; portion of ALJ's 
decision crediting discharged employee's testimony over supervisor's did not refer 
to demeanor of either; the reviewing agency need not apply to an ALJ's findings the 
same deference a reviewing court of appeals must to an agency, when the agency's 
"broader experience and expertise" apply; here, the Board differed from the ALl "in 
the inferences it drew from the whole of the testimony"; both sets of inferences had 
support in the record, and there was "substantial evidence" in support of the Board's 
conclusion that employees were discharged for legitimate reasons). 
• Community Clinic, Inc. v. Department of Health & Mental Hygiene, 174 Md. App. 526, 
922 A.2d 607 (2007) (AU proposed reimbursement from Medicaid, as claimant's costs 
reasonable and state administrative cap, applied to claimants, was in conflict with federal 
law ~Secretary adopted ALl's findings of fact but rejected her reasoning (regarding 
derivative inferences) and legal conclusions ~ Board of Review aff'd ~ circuit court 
aff' d ~ Court of Special Appeals afT' d). 
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C. Example Where Decision Hinged Only on a Question of Law 
• Ceguerra v. Secretary of HHS, 933 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1991) (ALJ ~ Appeals Council -
District Court had all ruled in favor of Secretary; Court of Appeals rev'd) (Court of 
Appeals reversed Secretary's decision on ground that it applied an incorrect interpretation 
of the law in holding that value of room and board could not be a "loan"; Secretary had, 
on that ground counted value of the in-kind services as income to applicant's retroactive 
award of SSI benefits by 113). 
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